Remo szerint mástól kell hallaniuk.
Women are obligated in Havdalah, just as they are obligated in Kiddush. And there are those who argue. RAMA: Therefore, they should not recite Havdalah for themselves, rather they should hear Havdalah from men.
MB / Mg"Á: jobb, ha nem olyan férfitől hallják, aki már mondta.
...
És mi lesz a megivással? Azt ilyen esetben elengedjük, megihatja:
...
Áh"S is elég hasonló, de inkább mékél: ha tudja mondani, mondja, igya, ha nem, az se baj, ha mástól hallja (jobb mint a semmi, nem aggódik bráchá levátálá miatt, de máádif).
...
CE 14:43 (nem :44, ahogyan PT-ben áll), kortárs gádol, aki kifejezetten és határozottan vitatkozik a MB-val, először valakivel, aki nér ügyében félreérti, aztán magával az MB-vel is, a 2. alpontban kezdődik az igazán érdekes rész:
Ugyanennek a legvégén teljes pompájában hozza a "ne igyák meg a bort" kabbalisztikus Slá-t.
Násim biklál árvut?
Külön nagy téma. PT hozza itt is, mint extra sznif, hogy miért ne férfi jajcéztasson, Kidus kapcsán hosszabban, hogy ott szotém MB, hogy simán van árvut. Ugyanakkor ugyanő Megilá kapcsán BH-ban misztápék... Ott a Dirsu bővebb, és elárulja: Dg"M / RAE máchloket.
2. Women are obligated in Kiddush, even though it is a positive commandment that time causes (meaning, a positive commandment dependent on time), because Remember is compared to Guard. And these women, since they are included in watching, they are include in remembering. And they can discharge men (from their obligation) since they are obligated biblically, like them.
...
That all are obligated to read megillah. Containing 6 paragraphs:
All are obligated in reading [the megillah]: men, women, converts, and freed slaves. We teach the children to read.
Itt a száfék, amit Dirsu is hoz:
...
Dirsu / Máhárit: a feleség nem tudja kényszeríteni a férjét. Dg"M: nem voltak benne a Hár Gerizim / Hár Évál szövetségben.
De mi is az árvut forrása pontosan? Gemárá a rokonok tanúságáról és Szifrá Midrás:
MISHNA:And these are the ones disqualified from bearing witness or from serving as judges due to their status as relatives of one of the litigants or of each other: One’s brother, and his paternal uncle, and his maternal uncle, and his sister’s husband, and the husband of his paternal aunt, and the husband of his maternal aunt, and his mother’s husband, and his father-in-law, and his brother-in-law, i.e., the husband of his wife’s sister. They themselves, all of these people, and also their sons, and their sons-in-law are considered relatives. And his stepson alone is disqualified, but not his stepson’s sons or sons-in-law.
The Gemara asks: And are descendants not punished for the sins of their ancestors unless they adopt their behavior? But isn’t it written: “And they shall stumble one upon another” (Leviticus 26:37)? This verse is homiletically interpreted to mean that the Jewish people shall stumble, one due to the iniquity of another, i.e., they are punished for each other’s sins, which teaches that all Jews are considered guarantors, i.e., responsible, for one another.
5) (Vayikra 26:37) "And they will stumble, one man by his brother": It is not written "one man because of his brother" (i.e., in running), but "one man by his brother," the sin of his brother — whereby we are taught that all of Israel are responsible, one for the other.
És ki, miért feltételezte, hogy vonatkozik rájuk az árvut?
And the same law applies to men and women, in that they are obligated in the Kiddush of the day. This is the wording of the Kol Bo and the explanation of Rosh - "even to exempt others who do not know how to say the Kiddush on their own." The Bais Yosef brings this down and rules this way in Shulchan Arukh, but concerning Megillah (689) he writes in Shulchan Arukh that women may not exempt men. An he writes according to the Behag that our rabbi brought there, who disagrees with Rashi who wrote that women may exempt men. And here, he ruled like Rashi, as brought down in the Kol Bo. And the authorities contradict one another, because it appears that there should be no difference between Kiddush and Megillah. According to my opinion, it is better to be more stringent regarding Kiddush, just like we are regarding Megillah, that women may not exempt men. I have seen this written as well by Maharshal.
...
Idézi, hogy a Ros szerint sem bichlál árvut (sőt, szerinte biztosan nem, míg a Dg"M misztápék) – ez megmagyarázza, hogy a Tur sem hoz semmi ilyesmit a kidus ügyében.
...
Toszfotot is idézi a Dg"M, meglepő helyen, és váratlanul újraértelmez egy szugját a Szotában – látszólag mefurás, a témáinkat nem érinti, az implikációi az érdekesek, és az eredeti szugjában sem látszik. Viszont az kiderül, hogy honnan jön a Hár Gerizim-Hár Évál mint forrás.
...
The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the statements of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda Ish Kefar Akko and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? What does the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi add? Rav Mesharshiyya said: The matter of a guarantor and a guarantor for a guarantor is the difference between them. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, every Jew is not only rendered a guarantor for every other Jew, but he is also rendered a guarantor for every other Jew’s responsibility as a guarantor. Therefore, according to his calculation, the number of covenants is multiplied again by 603,550.