Bááláv imo

When any party borrows [an animal] from another and it dies or is injured, its owner not being with it, restitution must be made.

אם בעליו עמו BUT IF THE OWNER THEREOF BE WITH IT (lit., with “him”) — whether he be employed in the very kind of work for which the animal has been borrowed, or whether he be employed in any other work of the borrower — provided that he (the owner) was employed by the borrower when the loan was effected it is not necessary, in order to free him from restitution that he should be employed by the bailee at the time when the injury or death took place (Bava Metzia 95b).

If one borrowed a cow together with the service of its owner, or hired its owner together with the cow, or if he borrowed the service of the owner or hired him, and afterward borrowed the cow, and the cow died he is not liable, for it is written, “If its owner was with it no restitution need be made” (Exodus 22:14). But if he first borrowed the cow and afterward borrowed or hired the service of its owner, and the cow died, he is liable, for it is written, “Its owner not being with it, he must make restitution” (Exodus 22:13).

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בעליו אין עמו, according to the plain meaning of the text: “its owner is not present supervising the work the animal performed.” According to Baba Metzia 95 even if the owner was engaged with different work, as long as the owner is present while the death or injury occurred, the borrower is not liable for damages.

§ Rav Hamnuna says that the exemption from liability when one borrows an item together with the services of its owner exists only in very specific circumstances: A borrower is always liable, unless the item entrusted to him is a cow and its owner plows with it in the service of the borrower, or it is a donkey and its owner drives it by walking behind it in the service of the borrower, i.e., the owner and his animal are engaged in the same work. And even so, the borrower will not be exempt unless the owner is working for him from the time of the borrowing of the animal until the time when it is injured or dies. The Gemara notes: Evidently, Rav Hamnuna holds that the phrase: “Its owner is with him” (Exodus 22:14), teaches that the exemption from liability applies only when the owner is working for the borrower for the entire matter.

The commandment to judge the case of the borrower: To judge the case of the borrower, meaning to say a man who borrows any object or animal from his fellow. And borrowing is without a wage at all, but rather, he is doing a kindness for him to do him this favor. And if a disagreement breaks out between them about the matter, we must judge the law that is stated about this [upon] them, as it is written in this section (Exodus 22:13), “And if a man borrows from his neighbor, etc.” And regarding the law of the borrower, the Torah made [him] liable even for things of duress (out of his control) — as it is his responsibility: Since he borrowed it and did not put out any thing of his for it, behold he is like one who took out a monetary loan — who if something beyond his control occurred to him could not be exempt from [paying the] creditor, with the claim that it was duress. And about the matter that he is exempt if borrowing in the presence of the owners, we can say according to the simple understanding that the Torah did not make the borrower liable since the owner of the vessel or of the animal is with him — as since he is there, he will guard what is his. And even though the borrower is [still] exempt after the owners left [him], if they were there at the time of the borrowing — it is possible to answer about this that the Torah did not want to give different measures for its words and state that if the owners stay long, he will be exempt, but if [only] a little, he will be liable. [Instead,] the Torah commanded more generally that so long as the owners are there at the time of the borrowing, he will be exempt. And this is the reason that they, may their memory be blessed, said (Bava Metzia 95b), that if he was there with him at the time of the borrowing — even if he was not with him at the time of it breaking or dying — he is exempt; but if he was with him at the time of the breaking or the dying but he was not there at the time of the borrowing, he is liable. As the procedure depends on the beginning of the matter. And this very same reason suffices for us regarding that which he is also exempt if he rents [something] in the presence of the owners.

(Shemot 22:13-14) One who borrows items is responsible for damages, even if they are accidents ("ones"). However, if the owner is involved in the transaction, the borrower is exempt. This teaches that a person's actions are inherently linked to their essence. Hashem has given each person precious tools, such as their senses and a pure neshama. As explained in the Zohar on "when a person sells his daughter as a maidservant," a person can use these gifts as they will, enjoying the benefits, and thus is liable for accidents caused by their actions.
The way to avoid such strict judgment is through self-sacrifice to Hashem, making Him part of one's actions. This is likened to "borrowing with the owner," where complete commitment to Hashem exempts one from liability for accidents. If a person truly accepts Hashem’s dominion, their actions, even those that go wrong, are considered beyond their control and thus not their fault. Conversely, without proper acceptance of Hashem's dominion, accidents are considered negligence.
We see this principle in the case of a borrowed animal that dies due to its work, where the borrower is exempt. This indicates that sometimes Hashem gives a person tasks they cannot complete. Therefore, one should not be disheartened when unable to finish all tasks properly. This understanding reveals that sometimes, despite one's best efforts and the tools given by Hashem, completion of certain missions may not be possible.

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When a person borrows an article while the owner is working with him, he is not liable, even if the article that he borrowed is stolen or lost through negligence, as Exodus 22:14 states: "If the owner is with him, he need not make restitution." This applies, provided he asked the owner to work with him at the time he borrowed the article, as we have explained.
This leniency applies whether the borrower asked the owner to work for him as a favor or hired him, and whether he asked him to perform the same work as he performs with the article, he asked him or hired him to perform another task, or he had him perform any task in the world. Even if he told a colleague, "Give me a drink of water," and the person asking for the water asked to borrow his colleague's animal, if the owner gives him a drink and lends him the animal, it is considered as if he lent him the animal while "with the owner," and he is not liable.
If the borrower performed meshichah with the animal first, and afterwards the owner gave him to drink, this is not considered to be borrowing an article while the owner is working with the borrower. The same principles apply in all analogous situations.

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אם בעליו , “if its owner” was present at the time his animal died (and was aware that it had not been overworked) the borrower is free from paying any compensation.

לא ישלם, the borrower. The reason is that under most circumstances, the animal has been loaned after both parties had agreed what kind of work it would be used for. Its status therefore is similar to that of a gift on the understanding that it would be returned. When one makes this kind of gift one does not draw up a list of conditions pertaining to the precise use the gift may be made of. If such a list of conditions had indeed been drawn up the nature of the entire transaction would have been nullified, it would no longer be classified as a temporary gift at all, but the owner would remain effectively the owner, so that non return, even deliberately, would not constitute a dereliction resulting in his being entitled to compensation from the “borrower.” The presence of the owner during any accident which had befallen the loaned animal is taken by the Torah as proof that he had never relinquished any part of his ownership, hence he is not entitled to compensation. One does not get compensation for losing what belongs to one.

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It was said, if its owners were with him, he does not have to pay. Does he have to swear? Rebbi Ze`ira said, he swears. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La both are saying, he does not swear. A baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La: “Breakage, abduction, and death for which he is not liable in the cases of the paid keeper and the renter, and the borrower with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; loss and theft where the paid keeper and the renter are liable, is it not that a fortiori the borrower be not liable with the owner but liable without the owner?” For him who says it is obvious that he swears, should he not have to pay? Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: A baraita supports Rebbi Ze`ira. “The borrower, for whom the Torah was restrictive, with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; the paid keeper, for whom the Torah was lenient, a fortiori with the owner should not be liable, without the owner should be liable.” If you are saying, his problem was swearing, he should have stated “the paid keeper and the renter.” That means he only needs it for payment. It is difficult for Rebbi Ze`ira: the borrower swears if the owner was with him; if the owner was not with him he must pay. The unpaid keeper swears, whether the owner was with him or was not with him. You are saying that where the borrower pays the paid keeper swears. Where the paid keeper swears, the unpaid keeper should not be liable. Where the paid keeper pays, the unpaid keeper swears. What do you state about an unpaid keeper when the owner be with him? But some are asking, what do you state about an unpaid and a paid keeper, whether or not the owner be with him? Rebbi Abin said, any word of criminality. Rebbi Mana said, do we not find that the Torah treated loss and theft equally for the borrower? Therefore, we shall treat breakage, abduction, and death equally both for the unpaid and the paid keepers.

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the flesh of a borrowed animal was weakened due to the labor it performed for the borrower, what is the halakha? Is the borrower liable to compensate the owner of the animal?

The Sages taught: From where is it derived that a judge should not engage in advocacy [saneigeron] for his own statements and devise various pretexts to justify his erroneous rulings? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter” (Exodus 23:7). And from where is it derived with regard to a judge that a student who is an ignoramus should not sit before him to discuss the proceedings? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.” When an ignorant student engages in the proceedings, he is apt to cause the judge to err in judgment.